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Although the literature suggests that matters of contracting and governance in strategic innovation 
partnerships are interrelated and that governance of partnerships generally occurs with contractual 
heterogeneity, our understanding about the specific relationships between contracting and the 
partnership culture that facilitates joint transactions is rather vague. In this study we clarify how the 
complexity of contractual agreements between partners in conjunction with the alignment of their 
innovation objectives and the ambiguity inherent in their mutual contributions to the partnership can 
be used to predict the culture of the partnership. We find that innovation partnerships result to be 
one of four types: bureaucratic, market, clan, or adhocracy. Our result emphasizes the central role 
of contractual complexity as a suitable and relevant concept to capture the nature of inter-
organizational innovation partnerships. 
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1 Introduction 
Innovation has become the key strategy for many organizations to survive and grow in a very 
competitive and dynamic global environment. Strategic partnerships are an important means for 
organizations to achieve innovation objectives. Given the diversity and long history of innovation 
research, the term is notoriously ambiguous and often lacks a specific definition or measure (Adams, 
Bessant, & Phelps, 2006) yet innovation is viewed by commercial, non-commercial and government 
organizations alike as an important approach to improving organizational efficacy and profitability. 
In this paper, we understand innovation in broad terms, following Schumpeter (1934), who includes 
five types of activity; new production methods, new sources of supply, the creation of new products, 
the capitalization of new markets, and organizing business in new ways, The latter in particular 
includes new approaches that are applied to create value for the organization and its partners.  
Some of the key enablers of effective innovation have been explored and include strategic vision, 
culture, governance, and sense of urgency of the organization. Firms should balance exploitative and 
explorative ways of innovation and align their infrastructure, resources and organizational strategy to 
create dynamic innovation capabilities. However, the concept of developing unique competences 
within the organization as an exclusive source of competitive advantage is often inadequate in 
contemporary, disruptive, complex and global markets. Closed innovation based on self-reliance of 
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R&D is too slow and also costly to stay ahead of the competition. Thus, during the past three 
decades innovation has gone through evolutionary steps to collaborative innovation and more 
recently to open-innovation and co-innovation (Lee, Olson, & Trimi, 2010). 
In this paper we focus on collaborative innovation, which includes many new forms of partnerships, 
strategic alliances, joint ventures, and technology/patent relationships that have helped global leaders 
in their respective industries to combine their own core competencies with that of other world-class 
firms. Examples include such firms as Nike, Apple, Cisco, HP, Dell, Rockwell Collins, Kimberly-
Clark, Procter & Gamble and many others that have created value and innovation by combining 
resources and – for example - forming partnership for joint research and development that have 
delivered sustained competitive advantage (Tapscott & Williams, 2008).  
These strategic partnerships are often defined so broadly that it is nearly impossible to differentiate 
them from other types of interfirm relationships like e.g. supplier relationships. As “hybrid” 
organizational forms they are a way to manage exchanges or relationships that are more complex 
than a standard market exchange since they involve purposive linkages (Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 
2000), exchange, sharing or co-development (Gulati, 1995b), yet do not merit full integration 
(Gulati, 1998; Williamson, 1991; Zenger & Hesterly, 1997). Hence, we understand innovation 
partnerships as a unique form of organization, which in its simplest form can be defined as a group 
of stakeholders intentionally organized to accomplish an overall, common innovation goal or set of 
innovation goals, which are explicit or implicit, carefully considered and established through a 
strategic planning process.  
Generally, partnerships have been shown to be effective mechanisms for transferring knowledge 
(Doz, 1996), spreading risk (Hennart, 1988), and learning (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). Other studies 
have examined a host of further factors that relate to how partnerships are structured and their role in 
achieving strategic advantage. This growing body of research has also dealt with several aspects of 
innovation partnerships and found that the ability to successfully set up and manage them is affected 
by the contracting and governance arrangements that are put in place. Similarly, research suggests a 
positive and significant role of organizational culture or climate on innovation (Ahmed, 1998; 
Isaksen, Lauer, Ekvall, & Britz, 2001; Lee, Tan, & Chiu, 2008) and that innovation within alliances 
can be achieved by creating a learning culture (Linnarsson & Werr, 2004). The specific aspects of 
alliance contracting, governance and culture are inter-related, but no yet well understood. Therefor, 
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in this paper our focus is on examining contractual complexity and alliance culture including their 
antecedent factors as the key aspects for effectively mediating transactions of innovation 
partnerships. 
We present and empirically assess a conceptual framework to contribute to the academic literature. 
By embedding our framework in organizational control theory (Ouchi, 1980) and theoretical 
developments on organizational culture (Cameron & Quinn, 2011) and alliance contracts and 
contractual complexity (Ariño & Reuer, 2006a; Reuer & Ariño, 2007) we provide a more 
comprehensive explanation of the interplay of contractual complexity and organizational culture 
within innovation partnerships. Showing that contractual complexity, goal incongruence and 
performance ambiguity profile the culture of innovation partnerships extends present conjectures and 
allows us to better explain how aspects of the inter-organizational relationships relate to the success 
of innovation partnerships.  
2 Theoretical background  
Governance of innovation partnerships is about establishing alleged mechanisms that are used to 
influence and control partners, managers, and staff so that their decisions and actions serve the 
agreed and shared objectives. The alliance literature distinguishes relational and formal governance 
mechanisms (Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009) and also defines alliance governance structure 
traditionally by distinguishing non-equity and equity alliances. Formal governance mechanisms are 
policies, instruments, processes, and practices, which in innovation partnerships can involve, for 
example, a performance based compensation scheme for managers, the use of a board of directors as 
a means for decision making, the appointment of local innovation partnership managers, or the 
mutual agreement on formal provisions in a partnership contract. Relational governance in 
partnerships relates to social mechanisms that promote, for example, open communication and the 
sharing of information, trust, cooperation and other informal encouragement of a specific work ethic 
or work culture. The partners’ choices and combination of governance mechanisms results in a 
distinct governance form (or structure), which represents the organizational context in which the 
partnership takes place (Ariño & Reuer, 2006a).  
Both, formal and relational alliance governance have been studied widely and are influenced by 
aspects like co-ordination costs and appropriation concerns (e.g. Gulati & Singh, 1998; Oxley, 
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1997); risks; partnership task-scope and transaction-level characteristics (e.g. Oxley, 1999; Oxley & 
Sampson, 2004); technological intensity (Osborn & Baughn, 1990); strategic motivation (Nielsen, 
2003); division of labor (Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002); task complexity and inter-partner diversity 
(White & Lui, 2005); trust among partners (e.g. Gulati, 1995a; Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 
2006; Lui & Ngo, 2004; Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven, 1997; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 
1998); and inter-organizational structures (e.g. Gerwin & Ferris, 2004; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; 
1992). The management and control of these factors is reflected in the use of contractual provisions 
between partners (e.g. Reuer & Ariño, 2003; Reuer, Ariño, & Mellewigt, 2006; Sampson, 2004), 
that is, partners use contracts to define mutual rights and obligations by specifying resource 
allocations, practices of interaction and problem solving, as well as expected outputs (e.g. Argyres, 
Bercovitz, & Mayer, 2007; Ariño & Reuer, 2006a; Lerner & Merges, 1998; Luo, 2002). These 
arrangements provide the basis for operating the partnership. 
In this way, contractual arrangement and governance mechanism correspond not only with the 
structure of the partnership, but also its culture.  
The organizational culture of the partnership, however, is also a function of the underlying values 
and beliefs of the people who are operating it and thereby define in a basic taken-for-granted fashion 
the partnership’s view of itself and its environment (Schein, 2010). These beliefs and expectations 
serve as a normative order that influences how people perceive, think, feel and behave (O'Reilly, 
1989). As such, culture may directly or indirectly influence partnership governance and related 
contractual complexity or vice-versa. While understanding the role of culture remains a difficult task 
due to its elusive nature (Duncan, 1989), it certainly plays an integral part both as a reflection of and 
influence on characteristics of innovation partnerships including - for example – the formality and 
centrality of decision-making, or the extent to which actions are based on mutual understanding and 
trust.  
Hence, while governance and culture of innovation partnerships are naturally related, they are also 
associated with contractual specifications and related complexity. Here, we focus on the emergent 
organizational culture of the partnership and utilize organizational control theory to explain the 
occurrence of alternative types of partnership cultures.  
The organizational control perspective (Ouchi, 1980) and later additions (Cameron & Ettington, 
1988; Mintzberg, 1993) suggest that different organizational cultures can be classified in terms of 
5 
 
archetypes, namely market, clan, bureaucracy, adhocracy or any hybrid form of these. These types 
reflect the goal incongruence and performance ambiguity among partners (Cameron & Quinn, 1999; 
Ouchi, 1980). Goal incongruence refers to the fact that the goals of partners may not be entirely 
consistent, describing a state of diverging preferences or a lack of overlapping goals. Performance 
ambiguity, on the other hand, arises when the measurement of the partners’ contributions within the 
partnership is subject to uncertainty. 
Accordingly, antecedent factors to culture including levels of goal incongruence and performance 
ambiguity result in any one of four archetype cultures being the most efficient to mediate joint 
transactions: market culture is efficient when performance ambiguity is low and goal incongruence 
is high, bureaucracy is efficient when both goal incongruence and performance ambiguity are high, 
clans are efficient when goal incongruence is low and performance ambiguity is high (Ouchi, 1980), 
and, finally, adhocracies are efficient when goal incongruence and performance ambiguity are low 
(Cameron & Ettington, 1988; Mintzberg, 1993). The market culture type values productivity and 
efficiency; information is assumed complete and partners are aware of an explicit competitive price 
for each task or exchange. With a focus on achievement, this culture emphasizes centralized decision 
making and more formal coordination and control systems. The partners’ commitment to the joint 
organization’s objectives is obtained by self-interest and based on the price mechanism.  
Bureaucracies involve close personal surveillance and direction of subordinates by superiors with the 
information that is necessary for task completion being contained in rules. The cost of administration 
in bureaucracies is typically high. This culture values stability and control and emphasizes formal 
coordination, centralized decision-making and vertical communications where team members' roles 
are defined and enforced through formal rules and regulations.  
The clan culture adds a social dimension in assuming that in situations of great uncertainty and 
complexity, managerial control is established through the group’s system of beliefs and perceptions 
rather than through its behavior or output. Accordingly, in clan culture it is assumes that individuals 
are acculturated into a system of controls and meanings. Structurally, there is less emphasis on 
formal coordination and control systems, and a greater emphasis on participation, decentralized 
decision-making, horizontal communications and teamwork.  
Lastly, adhocracies represent a highly organic and unordered organizational culture. Members within 
an adhocracy generally perform complex work in small teams with substantial personal 
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communication. Adhocracy is designed to be flexible and adaptable to rapidly changing 
environments; it emphasizes growth and adaptability. Similar to the clan culture, there is an 
emphasis on informal coordination, control systems and horizontal communications (Quinn, 
Hildebrandt, Rogers, & Thompson, 1991; Zammuto & Krakower, 1991). 
The four cultural orientations are also confirmed by research that examined the relationship between 
organizational culture and effectiveness (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981) where it was shown that 
changes in effectiveness could be explained by an organization’s attention inward (toward internal 
dynamics) versus outward (toward external environment) and its preference for governance to depict 
flexibility versus control (Goodman, Zammuto, & Gifford, 2001). 
Although organizational control theory does not explicitly consider aspects of contractual 
complexity, we suggest that it can assist in providing a suitable theoretical underpinning to examine 
contractual complexity as an additional and important influence on culture in inter-organizational 
situations.  
We also consider the role and importance of contractual complexity of partnership agreements 
between innovation partners. The much observed heterogeneity of partnership agreements is based 
on variations in contractual complexity , which in turn reflects the often very different relational and 
situational characteristics of the partnership. Indeed, previous studies have suggested that complexity 
of agreements is the central concept of contracting (Reuer & Ariño, 2003). Following this work we 
understand contractual complexity as a design feature of the partnering firms’ agreements that 
reflects the number and stringency of the provisions that are being employed. Important aspects and 
antecedents of contractual complexity include asset specificity of the partnership, existence of prior 
ties among partnering organizations, time boundedness of the agreement, strategic importance of the 
partnership, and partner search costs (Reuer & Ariño, 2003).1 Although this work captures important 
aspects of contractual complexity, there are possibly additional factors like types of relational or 
environmental uncertainty, or the frequency of transactions among partners, that affect the 
complexity of partnership agreements. Recognizing the early stage of research in understanding 
                                                 
1 Asset specificity is the extent of the partners’ transaction-specific investments for the partnership; prior ties captures the 
role of previous partnerships; time boundedness is about the duration to operate the initiative; strategic importance is 
about the significance that partners give to their collaborative venture; and, finally, partner search concerns the costs that 
are associated with finding, evaluating, and negotiating with potential partners. 
7 
 
antecedents of contractual complexity we focus on the not yet systematically studied link between 
contractual complexity and partnership culture. 
While the different archetypes featured by the organizational control perspective address and explain 
social, cultural, and relational aspects of the partnership culture, the theory does not explicitly take 
into account the complexity of contractual provisions between parties; complexity that is 
heterogeneous across different types of partnerships. Yet, the conceptualization of contractual 
complexity (Ariño & Reuer, 2006a) and organizational culture (Ouchi, 1980) share theoretical 
foundation in transaction cost economics. Both perspectives assume environmental uncertainty, asset 
specificity, bounded rationality, and behavioral uncertainty to result in transaction costs that mediate 
the characteristics of the relationship between partnering organizations as well as their joint 
transactions. Hence, we consider the organizational control perspective as a suitable theoretical basis 
to address the role of contractual complexity in innovation partnerships because both goal 
incongruence and performance ambiguity share antecedents with contractual complexity.  
Goal incongruence, for example, is linked to asset specificity through related levels of decision-
making uncertainty and trust among alliance members; it relates to partner search costs through 
associated efforts of strategic goal alignment in the process of finding innovation partners; it is 
associated with prior ties through the degree of behavioral uncertainty and trust among partners; and 
it relates to the time boundedness of the partnership through the partners’ ability to better predict 
environmental uncertainties when the duration of the partnership is predetermined.  
Performance ambiguity too, is linked to prior ties through existing experience and trust among 
partners, and it relates to time boundedness through potentially opportunistic partner behavior in 
fixed term partnerships. In addition to the common set of antecedents, recent research has shown that 
variation in partnership governance can also be attributed to contractual complexity (e.g. Reuer & 
Ariño, 2007), a concept distinctively different to both goal incongruence and performance 
ambiguity.  
Hence, we need to further investigate relationships between contractual complexity and 
organizational culture, as well as the relationships of contractual complexity with performance 
ambiguity and goal incongruence. We suppose that the organizational control perspective provides 
not only a comprehensive explanation for organizational cultures of innovation partnerships but also 
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a suitable theoretical foundation for our framework that addresses the influence of contractual 
complexity on the resulting organizational culture of innovation partnerships.  
3 Hypotheses 
3.1 Effects of goal incongruence and performance ambiguity on contractual complexity 
When innovation partners negotiate contractual provisions, they consider the extent to which their 
objectives are corresponding as well as whether they are able to assess mutual contributions to the 
partnership or learn from each other (e.g. Doz, Olk, & Ring, 2000; Hennart, 1988). These two 
central aspects of inter-organizational collaboration are captured by the partners’ perception of goal 
incongruence and performance ambiguity. We suggest that there are also relations between goal 
incongruence, performance ambiguity and contractual complexity.   
Goal incongruence affects contractual complexity because alliance partners are likely to first achieve 
consistency of, and have a mutual understanding of, objectives before entering negotiations of 
detailed or suitably stringent contracts in order to safeguard their interests. Put simply, when goal 
incongruence is low (i.e. full goal congruence), contractual complexity is low, whereas in the case of 
significant goal incongruence, potential partners would either decide to not enter the partnership or 
opt for complex contracts. Performance ambiguity, on the other hand, influences contractual 
complexity because contract negotiation is more complex when it is difficult to measure outcomes or 
evaluate transactions (Barzel, 1982) and when tasks have little predictability (Demsetz, 1988). 
Conversely, when outcomes of the alliance are easily measurable and tasks are predictable, the 
complexity of contractual agreements, associated transaction costs, and the likelihood of re-
negotiation are low (Eisenhardt, 1985). However, contracts may also be left deliberately incomplete 
because performance is unverifiable (Bernheim & Whinston, 1998). Either way, when it is difficult 
to distinguish the partners’ contribution to the partnership and when inputs, processes, and outcomes 
are uncertain (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972), innovation partners require more and detailed contractual 
safeguards to balance the uncertainty about the partners’ capabilities and performance.  
Furthermore, factors like asset-specific investments, incentive alignment, and loyalty (Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972; Ouchi, 1979; Williamson, 1975) help reduce goal incongruence. Both goal 
incongruence and performance ambiguity can be reduced through increased efficiency of the 
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exchange as a result of cultural control (Ouchi, 1980; Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983). Cultural control 
refers to a common set of beliefs, meanings, and values among the individuals who operate the 
partnership develop effective habits, conventions, and routines for their daily practice (DiTomaso, 
1987; Scott, 1998). Cultural control requires time to evolve and might not be immediately effective 
in safeguarding opportunistic behavior when the collaborating organizations have no relational 
history. However, in cases of previous ties, cultural control can result in lower goal incongruence 
and performance ambiguity, leading to less complex contracts. 
Also, when partner search costs are high, firms may achieve very low goal incongruence (i.e. goal 
congruence) due to intensive partner evaluation and goal alignment processes, which could result in 
few or no obligation to establish complex contractual safeguards. However, in case of high partner 
search costs and significant goal incongruence, a partner would avoid entering the alliance or 
safeguard its interests through a complex contract. The latter case then also indicates a high strategic 
importance of the alliance, which can also lead to increased complexity of contractual agreements. 
Hence, a significant effort to find a partner and agree a contract with a partner for the most part helps 
achieve a good and deep understanding of the partners’ objectives (goal incongruence) and clarity 
about the partners’ contributions to the alliance (performance ambiguity).  
Finally, while the influence of time boundedness on contractual complexity is subject to perceived 
environmental and behavioral uncertainties (Ariño & Reuer, 2006a), we suppose that these 
environmental and behavioral uncertainties correspond with perceived levels of goal incongruence 
and performance ambiguity among partners. Hence, the effect of the firms’ intention to collaborate 
for a fixed versus undefined duration on the resulting complexity of contracts is mediated by the 
degree of goal incongruence and performance ambiguity among them. In sum, goal incongruence 
and performance ambiguity affect contractual complexity. We encapsulate the above in the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Greater goal incongruence between innovation partners is associated with 
greater contractual complexity. 
Hypothesis 2: Greater performance ambiguity between innovation partners is associated 
with greater contractual complexity. 
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3.2 Effects of contractual complexity on partnership culture 
We argue that the culture of innovation partnerships may differ depending on the complexity of 
contractual provisions. That is, the various enforcing and coordinating aspects of contractual 
provisions that guide joint transactions provide control beyond safeguarding partners against 
unforeseen events or partner opportunism (Ariño & Reuer, 2006a) since they, together with goal 
incongruence and performance ambiguity, influence the culture of the partnership. In what follows 
we discuss high, low, and moderate levels of contractual complexity and derive different effects for 
each of them. 
Contractual complexity refers to the stringency of the provisions to control various aspects of the 
partnership. This can include, for example, enforcement provisions like a detailed account of 
property rights and knowledge sharing, or informational aspects like measures of performance for 
each partner organization. Poppo and Zenger (2002) assert that complex contracts are more detailed 
regarding the specification of promises, obligations, and processes for the resolution of 
disagreements. Complex contracts include details like roles and responsibilities to be performed or 
specific procedures for monitoring, consequences of non-compliance, and description of expected 
outcomes or output.  
A bureaucratic culture emerges when the parties to a partnership seek to eliminate the potential for 
opportunistic behavior by quantifying and monitoring joint activities and mutual performance. 
Hence, within bureaucracies, partners assume that the majority of contingencies can be dealt with by 
policies, standardized procedures, formal division of responsibility, and hierarchical structures 
(Mintzberg, 1993), which are typically established within the contractual agreement for the 
partnership.  
Low levels of contractual complexity, on the other hand, mean that there are few and lenient 
provisions agreed upon. Partners may deliberately choose to only agree on a few provisions and not 
control aspects of the partnership because of high information costs or because contract terms may 
not be enforceable or are assumed to evolve as the partnership unfolds. Partners may then find it 
necessary to renegotiate their contracts at some stage, either because they encounter situations in 
which the contract is silent or where the contract specifies inefficient terms. Yet, while a contractual 
agreement between collaborating organizations may only encompass a few agreements for a fraction 
of the partnership’s scope, it can still enforce and entirely safeguard partners’ interests for the given 
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situation. A complex contract, in contrast, including less enforcement but more informational 
provisions, might fail to protect partners’ interests because of a lack in stringency of the set 
provisions. Overall, less contractual complexity gives partners more flexibility to experiment with 
different ways to control and shape the innovation partnership, while at the same time exposing it to 
more risk involved with uncertain situations.  
Within adhocracies formal and complex contractual agreements are rare because intensive informal 
interaction, spontaneity, casualness, and interpersonal familiarity act as their coordinating and 
integrating mechanisms (Jarillo, 1988). Because of these characteristics, adhocracies rely more on 
relational contracts (e.g. Bryant & Colledge, 2002; Goldberg, 1976; Heide, 1994; Macaulay, 1963) 
than on explicit and formal contracts. That is, innovation partners demonstrate flexibility and 
solidarity while solving problems as they desire continuity in the relationship, so that increased co-
operation, dependency, mutual trust, and commitment make it unnecessary to cover all contingencies 
in complex agreements (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Jeffries & Reed, 2000). Low contractual 
complexity can therefore support the development of adhocracy cultures for innovation partnerships; 
it helps foster minimal formalization of procedures, a highly organic structure, and mutual long-term 
relationships (Achrol, 1997; Daft, 1995). It also allows partners to make decisions without the 
presence of hierarchical structures and policies (Cameron & Ettington, 1988; Mintzberg, 1979).  
Hence, the interplay of contractual complexity, performance ambiguity, and goal incongruence is 
associated with different organizational cultures. While high levels of contractual complexity, 
performance ambiguity, and goal incongruence may lead to bureaucracies, low levels of contractual 
complexity, performance ambiguity, and goal incongruence may lead to adhocracy governance. We 
encapsulate the above by advancing the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: High contractual complexity, high goal incongruence, and high performance 
ambiguity in alliances is associated with bureaucracy partnership culture. 
Hypothesis 4: Low contractual complexity, low goal incongruence, and low performance 
ambiguity in alliances is associated with adhocracy partnership culture. 
Moderate contractual complexity represents the partners’ intention to balance between too much and 
too little control through contractual provisions. We associate the clan and market cultures with 
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moderate levels of contractual complexity and suppose that moderate contractual complexity in 
combination with high performance ambiguity and low goal incongruence results in clan culture, 
while moderate contractual complexity in combination with low performance ambiguity and high 
goal incongruence results in market culture.  
This is supported by the characteristics and the information requirements of clan and market 
cultures. In a partnership that has the attributes of a clan, trust and mutual understanding among the 
members usually reduces the need for monitoring, both in the pre-contractual and post-contractual 
phases. Consequently, the formal contracts that bind partners would likely display greater levels of 
completeness when opportunistic behavior is a possibility. On these grounds, Williamson and Ouchi 
distinguish between “hard” and “soft” contracting and argue that soft contracting represents the clan-
type culture. Hence, clan culture presumes that the identity of interests between the parties is much 
closer and formal contracts among parties are incomplete (Williamson, 1975). Further, clan culture 
is based on traditions where information is implicit; existing but mostly unstated (Ouchi, 1979), it is 
embedded in established systems of shared values and beliefs, common goals, and mutual 
understanding that, once adopted, are only moderately explicit and complex. While clan members 
may share general orientations but not necessarily specific knowledge (Williamson, 1975), they trust 
each other and trust the fact that know-how always stays within the clan, and that whatever action 
they take based on whatever knowledge they possess will ultimately be beneficial for all. 
Accordingly, there is less need to contractually formalize knowledge transfer, restrict knowledge 
sharing, and safeguard against knowledge spillover effects, since a common vision, shared 
objectives, and relational bonds among members of the clan predict those risks sufficiently. 
The market culture, on the other hand, represents an open structure in which highly autonomous 
partners establish contractual relationships that are characterized by discrete, often short-term, 
agreements that aim to facilitate an economically efficient exchange. Partner performance is 
unambiguous because the conditions and agreements of the collaboration are specific, complete, and 
monetized. Hence, information requirements within market cultures are explicit, fully accessible, 
and easy to understand (Ouchi, 1979) so that a market culture is based on simple mechanisms 
following simple contracts. Moreover, within market culture, exchange objects tend to be non-
specific, that is, the resources, products, services or knowledge that a partner contributes can also be 
found with other partners (Macneil, 1978; Williamson, 1985). Therefore, highly complex contractual 
agreements are not necessary since the competitive marketplace and standard contract regulations 
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and corresponding laws provide efficient safeguards to the parties for mediating their transactions 
(Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Besides, in a market culture, partners are equal and free, so that social 
relations among them are limited since developing them could incur costs or be irrelevant 
(Williamson, 1985). As a consequence, partners avoid the costs of agreeing on complex contracts 
that can influence and control their transactions. We encapsulate the above in the following final two 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 5: Moderate contractual complexity, high goal incongruence, and low 
performance ambiguity in alliances are associated with market partnership culture. 
Hypothesis 6: Moderate contractual complexity, low goal incongruence, and high 
performance ambiguity in alliances are associated with clan partnership culture. 
4 Method 
We conducted a study to assess the different effects of the previously described partnership culture 
and contract conditions and to examine whether the culture of innovation partnerships varies 
according to the interplay of contractual complexity, goal incongruence, and performance ambiguity. 
Managers of innovation partnerships were invited to provide their assessments of a single 
partnership experience.  
4.1 Sample 
To collect data we used the key informant method, which is an established way of gathering data 
(Philips, 1981), especially at the corporate level (e.g. Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002; Simonin, 1997). 
Because the core variables of this study exist at the level of the partnership, we designed the research 
to target respondents who are highly knowledgeable about their firm’s innovation partnerships. The 
partnership manager is both familiar with the contractual aspects, the governance arrangements and 
the characteristics of the partnership. We concluded that every manager with operational 
responsibility for the partnership is a suitable key informant (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993) and 
we requested these managers to identify one specific, preferably well-established partnership that 
they had detailed knowledge about. Key informants were asked to provide details regarding their 
experience, including their role, tenure with the organization, the developmental stage and duration 
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of the partnership, the number of partnering organizations, and how long the organizations had been 
working together.  
We contacted managers who were members of the Association of Strategic Alliance Professionals 
(ASAP), which is the leading professional association of alliance management professionals that is 
dedicated to the discipline of business collaboration. In addition we contacted alliance manger via 
the professional business-networking platform Xing and through a global business panel. Overall, 
we received 327 responses representing a response rate of 23%, which is similar to other studies on 
business collaboration (e.g., Heimeriks, Duysters, & Vanhaverbeke, 2005; Kale et al., 2002; Reuer, 
Park, & Zollo, 2002; Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002). The final data set consisted of 289 usable 
responses. All responses were from individuals who were or had been directly involved in 
innovation partnerships. The majority of participants (66.4%) had been working for their 
organization for more than five years and 77% had been working for the focal partnership for more 
than two years. The overall response rate is adequate given the experience and seniority of 
respondents.  
The three most frequently stated industry affiliations of participating managers were information 
technology (22%), healthcare and life science (14%), and consulting and professional services 
(11%). The majority of participating organizations were based in North America (78%), then Europe 
(16%), Asia (5%), and the rest of the world (2%). Over 40% of the firms employed more than 1,000 
employees, and 35% generated sales revenue of over 100 million US$. The innovation partnerships 
that the study participants focused on operated mainly at a global or multi-national level (46%), 
fewer operated at a national level (27%) or at a regional level (28%). More than half (65%) of the 
investigated partnerships were non-equity partnerships, and 21% were public–private partnerships.  
In order to ensure that the data was not biased as a result of non-response we compared early and 
late respondents with respect to a number of key variables like the number of employees, sales 
revenues, and experiences with collaboration (Mohr & Spekman, 1994; 2002). Chi-square tests 
showed that there was no difference between early and late respondents, which implied that there 
was no significant non-response bias in our data set (Armstrong & Overton, 1977; Kanuk & 
Berenson, 1975). 
Gathering cross-sectional data also creates the potential for common method variance to be an 
explanation for the interrelationships observed amongst the study constructs. To minimize this 
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possibility we designed the measurement constructs and the survey questionnaire thoroughly 
following the suggestions made by Podsakoff and co-authors (2003) and used Harman’s single-
factor test to verify that common method bias is not present (Luo & Tan, 2003). The presence of 
eleven factors with eigenvalues greater than one and the fact that the first factor only accounted for 
15.33 per cent of the variance, suggests there is no serious problem with common method bias 
(Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001). 
4.2 Instrument Development 
Existing scales were adopted and where it was not appropriate to directly use existing scales, 
modifications were made to suit the research context. Questionnaire items were pre-tested 
expansively. We verified the clarity of the items (DeVellis, 1991) in personal interviews with two 
practitioners and two experienced researchers, which helped gain a realistic understanding of the 
relevant practices of contracting, governance and culture of innovation partnerships and supported 
the suitability of the constructs for the measurement model. In a pilot study we sent 200 email 
invitations to managers who were registered members of the online professional business-
networking platform Xing. From the pilot study we gained 38 usable responses, representing a 
response rate of 19%, which we analyzed to evaluate the reliability of the constructs. In addition, the 
evaluation of the structural model using the partial least squares (PLS) estimation method indicated 
that the direction of predicted effects and the significance of related path coefficients were 
satisfactory. As a result of the analyses and additional feedback that we collected from pilot study 
participants, we were able to conclude with a workable questionnaire. Table 1 presents the 
measurement items for the key variables that were used in the final survey. 
4.3 Specification of the Measurement Model 
The explanatory variables in our study were goal incongruence, performance ambiguity, and 
contractual complexity. Goal incongruence is the degree to which preferences among innovation 
partners diverge or goals are inconsistent; it was measured using two reverse coded reflective items 
which were based on John and Reves’ (1982) scale for goal compatibility. Participants rated for 
example, “The partnering organizations have consistent objectives” on a five-point scale from 1, 
“strongly disagree,” to 5, “strongly agree.” Performance ambiguity is the degree to which the 
partners’ contribution and performance within the partnership is unclear and not easily measurable. 
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We adapted two reflective items based on Stump and Hedes’ (1996) scale for performance 
ambiguity which participants rated on a five-point scale. Statements included, for example “It is 
difficult to know whether our partner(s) do what they agreed upon.”  
Contractual complexity was assessed using a six item measurement construct including items for 
asset specificity, partner search costs, prior ties, time boundedness, and strategic importance (Reuer 
et al., 2006). Asset specificity is the degree to which partnering organizations commit resources like 
personnel, technology, and infrastructure to the partnership that are only utilizable within the context 
of the innovation partnership. We asked participants to rate a single item “We spend substantial 
effort and money on infrastructure that is dedicated exclusively to this partnership” on a five-point 
scale. Partner search costs are the costs of identifying suitable partners; it was measured on a five-
point scale using one item “ The total cost of finding our partner(s) was significant.” To verify the 
existence of prior ties we asked the participants if their organization had been partnering with each 
other before. We used a binary variable, assigning 1 when the firms had previous partnerships with 
each other and 0 when no previous ties existed. Similarly, time boundedness was measured by 
asking participants to specify whether the duration of the partnership was agreed to be open ended, 
or time-restricted in terms of an agreed duration (e.g. one year), or was based on the accomplishment 
of set objectives (e.g. a jointly developed product). We measured strategic importance of the focal 
partnership for the participants’ organization on a five-point scale from 1, “not important,” to 5, 
“very important.” In addition, participants were asked to consider the overall complexity of the 
contractual agreement taking into account the total number of provisions, as well as confidentiality 
and arbitration clauses rated on a scale from 1, “we made no contractual agreements,” to 5, “very 
complex; we agreed on many provisions and took care of most uncertainties.” 
The dependent variable in our study is partnership culture. We applied Cameron and Quinns’ (1999) 
Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) to measure the extent to which the focal 
innovation partnership represents a bureaucracy, market, clan or adhocracy. The OCAI has been 
developed to identify elements in the structure and culture of organizations; it is a suitable 
instrument to determine the values, beliefs and mechanisms that underlie the observable culture of 
the partnership. The theoretic assumptions on which the OCAI instrument is based are consistent 
with organization control theory. The OCAI has six dimensions: dominate characteristics, 
organizational leadership, management of employees, organizational glue, strategic emphasis, and 
criteria of success. For each of the six dimensions, participants were asked to divide 100 points 
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among four alternative statements depending on the extent to which each alternative reflected the 
culture of their innovation partnership.  
To control for other factors that could be related to partnership contracting and culture, we 
incorporated three control variables. First, we included a measure for the governance mode of the 
alliance. The involvement of shared equity in innovation partnerships is a sign of the partners’ 
motives for and significance of the partnership (Gulati, 1995b; Oxley, 1999; Oxley & Sampson, 
2004). We measured the governance mode using a binary variable, assigning 1 to partnerships that 
involved the use of equity and 0 for non-equity partnerships. Second, the number of partners seeking 
to co-ordinate their activities might have influenced organizational culture. We therefore included a 
measure to assess whether the partnership was between multiple partners or two partners only. As a 
third control variable we measured the duration of the partnership because partners in long-lasting 
collaborations typically developed a mutual understanding so that impeding conflicts are less likely 
(Lin & Germain, 1998; Martin, Swaminathan, & Mitchell, 1998) and governance more flexible with 
mutual trust among partners. We measured duration by capturing the number of years that a 
partnership had been in existence at the time of measurement (Kotabe, Martin, & Domoto, 2003; 
Simonin, 1999). 
4.4 Method of estimation 
To estimate the hypothesized relationships, we used Partial Least Squares (PLS-SEM) analysis with 
smartPLS (version 2.0 M3) (Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005). For an overview of the methodology see 
Chin (1998), Hair, Ringle, and Sarstedt (2011), Henseler, Ringle, and Sinkovics (2009), and 
Lohmöller (1989); and for some illustrative applications in strategic management see Birkinshaw, 
Morrison, and Hulland (1995), Johansson and Yip (1994), Robins, Tallman, and Fladmoe-Lindquist 
(2002) and Gudergan, Devinney, Richter, and Ellis (2012). 
PLS-SEM is an analytical approach to situations where theory is less established and where the 
available variables or measures would not necessarily conform to a rigorously specified 
measurement model (Bagozzi & Yi, 1994; Barclay, Higgins, & Thompson, 1995; Fornell & Cha, 
1994; Henseler et al., 2009). This is particularly relevant given that research on contracting and 
culture of innovation partnerships is still in its development stage with concepts and relationships not 
yet empirically examined or generally accepted as a central theory. That is, the connections between 
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contractual complexity, goal incongruence, and performance ambiguity on one side and the culture 
within innovation partnerships on the other have been relatively unexplored in prior research. 
By using this methodology, we followed a growing number of researchers (Duxbury & Higgins, 
1991; House, Spangler, & Woycke, 1991; Kahai, Sosik, & Avolio, 1997; Sosik & Godshalk, 2000) 
and expected to detect relations that might not be revealed with a more standard regression analysis 
method (Wilcox, 1998).  
PLS-SEM has a number of other characteristics that are of advantage to our research: First, it accepts 
small sample sizes in order for the algorithm to work - which is important given that our samples are 
relatively small. Second, it does not require multivariate normality, which applies to our study. 
Third, it produces consistent parameter estimates; and, finally, PLS-SEM it is more suitable, 
compared to covariance-based methods, when measuring formative constructs, which applies to 
some of our constructs (Fornell & Bookstein, 1982; Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2012; Henseler et al., 
2009; Lohmöller, 1989; Reinartz, Haenlein, & Henseler, 2009). 
5 Results  
The hypothesized relationships and empirical estimations are illustrated in Figure 1. Before 
interpreting results in the structural (inner) model, we evaluate the suitability of the measures (i.e., 
the outer models) used to operationalize the latent variables. Based on assessing the correct 
specification of the measurement models, we will evaluate the predictive power of the structural 
model (Henseler et al., 2009), and report on the observed effects. 
5.1 Model assessment 
The overall construct reliability of multi-item scales for explanatory and dependent variables was 
tested by looking at the composite reliability (CR) and average variance extracted (AVE), which 
demonstrated satisfactory results (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Table 2 presents relevant CR and AVE 
results. The estimated indices for all constructs were above the threshold (Bagozzi, 1988) of .60 for 
CR, while the indices for AVE were slightly below the threshold of .50; however, CR indices clearly 
exceeded the threshold value. Furthermore, the analysis of cross-loadings revealed that each item 
loaded higher on its respective construct than on any other construct in the model and that all 
constructs loaded highest with their allocated items (Chin, 1998). In Table 3 the cross-loadings are 
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presented; factor loadings on respective constructs are shown in bold. To further examine 
discriminant validity of the complete measurement model we also tested whether the AVE measures 
for any two constructs that are related in the conceptual model exceeded their squared correlations 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981) and found that this condition was satisfied. Overall, the analysis of the 
measurement model implied discriminant validity. 
5.2 Results of the PLS Estimation 
The evaluation of the PLS structural model is typically based on three criteria: the direction and 
significance of the path coefficients, the effect size (ƒ2), and the size of the coefficient of multiple 
determination (R2) for the latent endogenous variables (Götz, Krafft, & Liehr-Gobbers, 2005; 
Hulland, 1999). In what follows we present the results and interpret our findings. 
Table 4 and Table 5 summarize the results of the PLS analysis. Supporting Hypothesis 1 and 2, we 
find that goal incongruence (GI) and performance ambiguity (PA) significantly influence contractual 
complexity (CC). We see partial support for Hypothesis 3, that is, contractual complexity and 
performance ambiguity in innovation partnerships are positively and significantly associated with 
bureaucracy culture (B), while the effect of goal incongruence on bureaucracy turns out to be not 
significant. The r-square indicates that 10% (R2=.103) of the variation in bureaucracy can be 
accounted for by the explanatory variables in the model.  
Further, in support of Hypothesis 4 we find no significant effects of goal incongruence on adhocracy 
culture (A) and a significant negative effect of contractual complexity and performance ambiguity 
on adhocracy. The r-square for adhocracy (R2=.063) indicates that only 6% of the variation in this 
organizational form can be accounted for by the explanatory variables in the model. 
Hypothesis 5 is supported since goal incongruence is positively and significantly related to market 
culture (M), contractual complexity has a significant moderating effect on the relationship between 
goal incongruence and market-type culture, and performance ambiguity shows no significant effect. 
The r-square for the market culture was .134, indicating that 13% of the variation in market culture is 
explained by the explanatory variables in the model.  
Finally, Hypothesis 6 receives partial support since goal incongruence shows the anticipated 
negative and significant effect on clan culture (C), and a positive effect of performance ambiguity on 
clans. The expected moderating effect of contractual complexity on the relationship between 
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performance ambiguity and clans could not be observed. The r-square value indicates that 19% of 
the variation in clan culture (R2=.187) is explained by the explanatory variables in the model.  
We also analyzed the effects stemming from the included control variables. The results show that the 
duration of the innovation partnership (DU), the partnership mode (MO), and the number of partners 
(NU) also influence organizational culture. Including the control variables in our estimation, 
however, did not change the hypothesized effects of the core model.  
Overall, the r-square results for the four latent organizational form variables in the structural model 
suggest a rather weak model fit (Chin, 1998), since on average about 12% of the variation in 
partnership culture is explained by goal incongruence, performance ambiguity, and contractual 
complexity. 
6 Discussion 
The present study was an initial investigation of the relationships between the contractual 
complexity of partnership agreements, the goal incongruence and performance ambiguity among 
innovation partners as well as the consequences of these factors for the culture of innovation 
partnerships. Our aim was to clarify the intricacies of contractual complexity and cultures present in 
contemporary innovation partnerships. In what follows we discuss our findings and contribution.  
6.1 Theoretical contributions 
An important first result is that we find significant relationships of goal incongruence and 
performance ambiguity with contractual complexity. This result is in accordance with the theoretical 
relationships we proposed here and represents a first step towards understanding the intricacies of 
contracting and culture in innovation partnerships. The finding adds to the research that has 
investigated antecedent factors to complexity in partnership agreements (Ariño & Reuer, 2006a; 
Reuer & Ariño, 2007; Reuer et al., 2006) in that it indicates that goal incongruence and performance 
ambiguity determine contractual complexity just like the specificity of the partnership investment, 
the costs that are associated with finding a partner, the time boundedness of the partnership, and its 
strategic importance. However, the result also suggests that goal incongruence and performance 
ambiguity are not only antecedent to contracting arrangement between innovation partners but also 
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their joint innovation culture. It, thus, provides a basis on which we can advance our understanding 
of the relationship between contracting and culture in innovation partnerships. 
Further research is needed to better understand these relationships. For example, previous 
partnerships between innovation partners may correlate with reduced contractual complexity, goal 
incongruence and performance ambiguity among them. Organizations that repeatedly collaborate 
may re-use contractual provisions or negotiate a general skeleton agreement, which significantly 
reduces complexity of contractual provisions for the single innovation partnership. Ryall and 
Sampson (2006) offer some support for this effect, suggesting that when firms are engaged in 
multiple partnerships with the same partner, some common terms, such as arbitration clauses, are 
identical across all partnerships. On the other hand, a partners’ perception of goal incongruence and 
performance ambiguity may just as likely only relate to the particular joint project at hand, where 
additional factors, such as risks that are associated with each new partnership (Ring & Van de Ven, 
1992) override the possible reducing effect.  
The central result of our study, however, is that it provides strong support for a fundamental role and 
the influence of contractual complexity on the emergent culture of innovation partnerships. Although 
not all relationships in the model estimation clearly support the hypothesized effects on bureaucracy, 
market, clan, and adhocracy cultures, we can account for a strong and significant influence of 
contractual complexity on the culture of innovation partnerships. Thus, with increasing levels of 
contractual complexity, culture in innovation partnerships takes on the characteristics of a 
bureaucracy, following the relationships proposed here based on organizational control theory. 
Given that the governance mechanisms underlying bureaucracy culture are typically subject to 
contractual provisions (e.g. Reuer & Ariño, 2003; Reuer et al., 2006; Sampson, 2004) we find 
evidence of complexity of contracts between these partnering organizations.  
Adhocracy, on the other hand, showed a significant negative relationship with contractual 
complexity, which confirms our prediction that complex contractual agreements are rare within 
adhocracies due to intensive but informal interaction, spontaneity, casualness, and interpersonal 
familiarity among team members (Jarillo, 1988). Finally, for market and clan cultures we also find 
that the level of contractual complexity influences their development, that is, high levels of 
contractual complexity support market and inhibit clan cultures. This is in accordance with our 
prediction; in particular, in conjunction with the result that contractual complexity moderates the 
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effect of goal incongruence in case of market cultures and the insignificance of performance 
ambiguity as an antecedent of market culture.  
While we showed how aspects of contractual complexity and partnership culture relate to 
uncertainties about goals and mutual performance among innovation partners, it would be especially 
fruitful to understand whether these influences occur simultaneously or if they are sequential. 
Likewise, further investigation of the causality of these relationships would reveal potentially 
interesting results. Hence additional longitudinal and case research is needed where sequence and 
causality of these influences on the development of partnership cultures can be observed. 
Even though the existing literature suggests that contracting and governance in alliances are 
interrelated (Ariño & Reuer, 2006a) and that governance in collaborations occurs with contractual 
heterogeneity (Lerner & Merges, 1998; Reuer & Ariño, 2003), the specific relationships between 
such factors remain vague. In this study we contributed to further clarifying the role and influence of 
contractual complexity in conjunction with the effects of goal incongruence and performance 
ambiguity on the type of culture that emerges in innovation partnerships. In doing so we add to a 
body of literature that suggests a range of aspects - like asset specificity, partner search costs, prior 
ties, alliance time boundedness, strategic importance, firm age (Reuer & Ariño, 2002; 2003; 2007; 
2006), technology scope and transactions activities (Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 1989), technological 
change, and performance measurement difficulty (Poppo & Zenger, 2002) - influence contracts, 
governance and culture of partnership. Along those lines we also suggest that contractual complexity 
and partnership culture share antecedent factors, which contributes to the organizational control 
perspective by expanding on the existing conjecture that goal incongruence and performance 
ambiguity alone determine partnership culture. Hence, in inter-organizational situations the 
contractual complexity among partners is a third formative and significant dimension to consider. 
This contribution is important because it emphasizes the limitation of present organizational control 
theory in explaining inter-organizational culture and because it provides the basis for a more 
comprehensive perspective that includes contractual complexity. Our work also contributes to the 
contracting literature in that it further clarifies the central role of contractual complexity as a suitable 
and relevant concept to capture the nature of an inter-organizational relationship and its importance 
for understanding emerging innovation culture in partnership situations.  
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6.2 Managerial implication 
From a managerial perspective our study results show how important it is for innovation partners to 
better understand what the underlying factors of contractual agreements and governance mechanisms 
are particularly when aiming for specific innovation outcomes. The firm’s ability to negotiate 
partnership contracts is influenced by a range of factors which, when explicit and better understood, 
can help the partners avoid unnecessarily complex agreements or, on the other hand, include crucial 
contractual agreements to safeguard against the unwanted actions of partners and innovation team 
members.  
In addition, our findings offer some interesting suggestions for the harmonization of partnership 
contracts and innovation partnership culture. While we find that different levels of goal 
incongruence, performance ambiguity, and contractual complexity establish certain cultures, we 
suppose it is also practical to plan governance and culture for a focal innovation partnership by 
intentionally reducing contractual complexity. That is, in situations where the partnership requires a 
high level of sovereignty, creative freedom, and autonomy, for example in the case of R&D 
partnerships or skunkwork projects, (Bommer, DeLaPorte, & Higgins, 2002) innovation partners 
should avoid high contractual complexity with restrictive and controlling enforcement provisions. 
Hence, while accounting for the relationships proposed here, that is assessing the goal incongruence 
and performance ambiguity and managing the complexity of the partnership contract, firms would 
be able to identify and employ partnership cultures that better support their strategic intentions and 
ultimately benefit their joint and individual performance. Consequently, the ability to negotiate and 
manage the complexity of alliance contracts becomes critical for innovation partners. We suggest 
that upcoming research on alliance contracts should examine this ability as a dynamic capability in 
collaborative innovation formation and management (Mayer & Argyres, 2004). 
6.3 Limitations and direction for future research 
A limitation of our framework and this study is that it rests on restricted theoretical assumptions. 
Even though we focus on organizational control theory, there might be other aspects of partnership 
contracting and management that are important to consider. For example, Ring and Van de Vens’ 
(1994) process perspective of alliance contracting implies an influence of a psychological contract 
on the behavioral uncertainty that the contracting parties face once they are partners. The 
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psychological contract goes beyond and may complement or substitute the agreement of a legal 
document. In their framework, contracting is a part of the commitment stage of collaborations where 
mutual consent is achieved by a process of sense making, which occurs when the parties interact 
intensively. The parties assess their possible compatibility and develop opinions about each other 
which can result in a psychological contract (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). The role and influence of 
the psychological contract have not been considered in our framework. We suggest that upcoming 
conceptual and empirical studies include psychological contracts when discussing the relationships 
between contracting and culture in innovation partnerships.  
Another theoretical perspective that we have not considered here and which has in general not been 
considered much in the field of partnership management and governance is the organizational 
behavior perspective (Ariño & Reuer, 2006b). Future research could, for example, look at the 
implications of the relationships proposed in this study and examine how they relate to other 
innovation management and collaboration phenomena such as various types of behavioral dynamics 
at the individual or group level, process dimensions of collaboration, and the organizational and 
managerial context of partnership formation and management including managerial capabilities, 
leadership behavior, and the functioning of teams within and across organizations. Hence, expanding 
on the model presented here offers a plethora of additional research opportunities. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1: Structural model and hypotheses 
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Table 1: Survey items 
Construct Item/Scale 
Goal  
Incongruence (GI) 
(1) The partnering organizations have consistent objectives (reverse coded). (2) The 
strategic goals of partners are in harmony (reverse coded). 
Performance  
Ambiguity (PA) 
(1) It is unclear how we can assess the performance of our partner(s). (2) It is difficult to 
know whether our partner(s) do what they agreed upon. 
Contractual  
Complexity (CC) 
(1) We spend substantial effort and money on infrastructure that is dedicated exclusively 
to this partnership. (2) The total cost of finding our partner(s) was significant. (3) Did your 
organization have alliances with one or more of the partners prior to this one? (4) What is 
the agreement among partners regarding the duration of the partnership? (5) How do you 
rate the overall strategic importance of this partnership to your organization in general at 
the present time? (6) When considering the contractual agreement between your 
organization and your partner(s), and taking into account the total number of provisions, 
confidentiality clauses or arbitration clauses, etc., how complex is the contractual 
agreement?  
Adhocracy (A) (1) This alliance is a very dynamic and entrepreneurial place. People are willing to stick 
their necks out and take risks. (2) The leadership in this alliance is generally considered to 
exemplify entrepreneurship, innovating, or risk taking. (3) The management style in this 
alliance is characterized by individual risk-taking, innovation, freedom, and uniqueness. 
(4) The glue that holds the alliance together is commitment to innovation and 
development. There is an emphasis on being on the cutting edge. (5) This alliance 
emphasizes acquiring new resources and creating new challenges. Trying new things and 
prospecting for opportunities are valued. (6) This alliance defines success on the basis of 
having the most unique or newest products. It is a product leader and innovator. 
Bureaucracy (B) (1) This alliance is a very controlled and structured place. Formal procedures generally 
govern what people do. (2) The leadership in this alliance is generally considered to 
exemplify coordinating, organizing, or smooth-running efficiency. (3) The management 
style in this alliance is characterized by security of employment, conformity, predictability, 
and stability in relationships. (4) The glue that holds the alliance together is formal rules 
and policies. Maintaining a smooth-running alliance is important. (5) This alliance 
emphasizes permanence and stability. Efficiency, control and smooth operations are 
important. (6) This alliance defines success on the basis of efficiency. Dependable 
delivery, smooth scheduling and low-cost production are critical. 
Clan (C) (1) This alliance is a very personal place. It is like an extended family. People seem to 
share a lot of themselves. (2) The leadership in this alliance is generally considered to 
exemplify mentoring, facilitating, or nurturing. (3) The management style in this alliance 
is characterized by teamwork, consensus, and participation. (4) The glue that holds the 
alliance together is loyalty and mutual trust. Commitment to this alliance runs high. (5) 
This alliance emphasizes human development. High trust, openness, and participation 
persist. (6) This alliance defines success on the basis of the development of human 
resources, teamwork, employee commitment, and concern for people. 
Market (M) (1) This alliance is a very results oriented. A major concern is with getting the job done. 
People are very competitive and achievement oriented. (2) The leadership in this alliance 
is generally considered to exemplify a no-nonsense, aggressive, results-oriented focus. (3) 
The management style in this alliance is characterized by hard-driving competitiveness, 
high demands, and achievement. (4) The glue that holds the alliance together is the 
emphasis on achievement and goal accomplishment. Aggressiveness and winning are 
common themes. (5) This alliance emphasizes competitive actions and achievement. 
Hitting stretch targets and winning in the marketplace are dominant. (6) This alliance 
defines success on the basis of winning in the marketplace and outpacing the competition. 
Competitive market leadership is key. 
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Table 2: Indicator and construct reliability 
Construct Items AVE CR 
Goal Incongruence (GI) 2 .77 .87 
Performance Ambiguity (PA) 2 .75 .85 
Contractual Complexity (CC) 6 .62 .76 
Adhocracy (A) 6 .40 .80 
Bureaucracy (B) 6 .48 .68 
Clan (C) 6 .49 .85 
Market (M) 6 .47 .84 
Table 3: Cross-loadings of measurement items 
 
 
Item CC GI PA A B C M 
cc1 .57 .11 .32 .14 .10 .11 .05 
cc2 .78 .04 .37 .21 .11 .24 .15 
cc3 .22 .14 .08 .05 .02 .00 .03 
cc4 .28 .01 .06 .00 .12 .15 .07 
cc5 .14 .07 .03 .01 .01 .10 .13 
cc6 .67 .00 .04 .06 .24 .37 .26 
gi1 .14 .73 .15 .01 .05 .08 .09 
gi2 .05 .88 .19 .02 .12 .18 .25 
pa1 .19 .17 .72 .09 .20 .07 .04 
pa2 .27 .28 .91 .14 .26 .25 .12 
a1 .10 .07 .01 .59 .27 .03 .08 
a2 .08 .06 .05 .50 .10 .09 .04 
a3 .20 .03 .11 .70 .11 .12 .04 
a4 .11 .08 .10 .78 .09 .15 .13 
a5 .05 .10 .05 .55 .10 .07 .11 
a6 .16 .02 .13 .69 .02 .17 .03 
b1 .16 .07 .11 .26 .70 .33 .11 
b2 .12 .12 .10 .22 .34 .08 .31 
b3 .07 .00 .17 .16 .49 .20 .21 
b4 .11 .03 .15 .27 .67 .36 .07 
b5 .02 .06 .02 .22 .47 .25 .08 
b6 .05 .05 .10 .23 .42 .12 .19 
c1 .26 .04 .11 .03 .33 .65 .45 
c2 .10 .11 .02 .02 .06 .50 .44 
c3 .35 .14 .25 .25 .43 .73 .51 
c4 .30 .12 .22 .15 .38 .79 .47 
c5 .19 .13 .09 .04 .23 .76 .56 
c6 .15 .13 .01 .05 .09 .64 .51 
m1 .01 .02 .00 .18 .20 .34 .39 
m2 .14 .18 .08 .22 .36 .49 .71 
m3 .24 .15 .09 .02 .17 .64 .83 
m4 .18 .17 .04 .12 .12 .49 .70 
m5 .21 .13 .04 .09 .03 .46 .73 
m6 .07 .15 .01 .10 .08 .36 .65 
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Table 4: PLS estimation results for structural model 
Hypotheses (Proposed effect) 
 N = 289 
Path Coefficient f2 
t-statistic  
(p-value) 
 
Effects of Goal Incongruence and Performance Ambiguity 
H1: GI → CC (+) .21 3.32**  (.0204) 
H2: PA → CC (+) .38 7.56**  (.0000) 
 
Effects of Contractual Complexity 
H3: GI → B .10 .76  (.4478) 
 CC → B .24 3.37**  (.3178) 
 PA → B .21 2.70**  (.1751) 
H4: GI → A -.02 .47  (.6351) 
 CC → A -.10 2.45*  (.0145) 
 PA → A -.17 2.31*  (.0208) 
H5: GI→M .19 3.01**  (.0026) 
 CC→M .24 5.35**  (.0000) 
 PA→M .01 .66  (.5089) 
 GI×CC→M .18 3.43**  (.0161) 
 PA×CC→M .13 .77  (.0048) 
H6: GI→C -.13 2.30*  (.2310) 
 CC→C -.36 6.45**  (.0000) 
 PA→C .15 5.61**  (.0000) 
 GI×CC→C -.01 1.62†  (.0967) 
 PA×CC→C -.21 .99  (.0048) 
 
Effects of control variables 
Duration of partnership DU→B -.01 .51  (0.0021) 
Duration of partnership DU→M -.09 2.74*  (0.0005) 
Duration of partnership DU→C .15 3.38**  (0.0008) 
Duration of partnership DU→A .13 2.11*  (0.0006) 
Governance mode MO→B .01 1.05  (0.0034) 
Governance mode MO→M .12 3.28**  (0.0006) 
Governance mode MO→C -.05 1.18  (0.0003) 
Governance mode MO→A -.12 2.01*  (0.0038) 
Number of partners NU→B .05 .61  (0.0064) 
Number of partners NU→M -.11 2.15*  (0.0014) 
Number of partners NU→C .09 1.88†  (0.0008) 
Number of partners NU→A .00 .71  (0.0010) 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01, ns = insignificant;  
total effect-size (ƒ2) = path coefficient 
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Table 5: R-square results 
Dependent Variable 
(N = 289) 
R2  
(excl. control variables) 
R2  
(incl. control variables) 
Bureaucracy (B) .103 .109 
Market (M) .134 .190 
Clan (C) .187 .226 
Adhocracy (A) .063 .095 
Average .122 .155 
 
